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The French state, in its role as legislator,has sustained relations of production within
the French economy because space can be selectively configured to promote
economic, social, and environmental community goals. It tries to avoid that public
value be held captive to private value or that developers bypass environmental legis-
lation. In a country where the state is in the habit of regulating everything, it is not
surprising that it should have taken charge of tourism projects. This paper will deter-
mine whether the relationship between public and private enterprise in tourism
development in France, where the government has systematically encouraged such
partnerships, has been successful. The paper will also show whether leadership
provided by the public sector in areas not necessarily focused on tourism develop-
ment is what helped push France among the most visited countries in the world.
Decentralisation policy has driven the state to the backstage where it remains active
to ensure the continued presence of France on the international scene. Although it is
tempting to advocate a particular form of governance in supporting tourism develop-
ment, most forms have evolved within specific contexts and would be resistant to
radical transformations. A careful scrutiny of specific examples helps to illustrate
possible effective changes.
Introduction
Economic success does not last forever. To remain vital, economies need
continuously to assess their assets and liabilities and redefine their unique quali-
ties, capabilities, comparative advantages and vulnerabilities. Capitalism’s most
lasting product is new landscapes, which, in many places, it has rendered imper-
manent, forever exhibiting a new repertoire. Such shifting landscapes created by
multinationals in their quest for the best return on their investments illustrate the
structural changes of the global economy which have, for example, led an Ameri-
can corporationto implant a major American artefact in the Francilian landscape.
Does regulation through public authorities have a role in capturing circuits of
capital that will develop tourism and create economic growth? Successful regu-
lation means that capital accumulation is accompanied by social benefits (i.e. the
capital circuit becomes geographically stabilised and sustainable, functioning as
an economic locomotive, and the landscape is made more permanent). The free
market is an indispensable element of democratic systems but it cannot resolve
crises of accumulation when it lacks institutionalised rules for sustainable
conduct. The creation and growth of sustainable regional economies result not
just from atomised decisions of private productive firms, be they global or local,
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such as the Walt Disney Company, but also from a ‘politics of space’ at the
national, regional and local levels (Storper, 1997).
This paper seeks to demonstrate that the articulated use of state regulation at
all levels of governance can sustainably anchor tourism circuits of capital in
search of profitable locations by offering them customised spaces. It will criti-
cally examine whether the relationship between public and private enterprise in
tourism development in France, where the government has systematically
encouraged partnerships with the private sector has been successful. Policies
promoting physical redevelopment through public–private partnerships were
heralded as the key to economic success (Fainstein, 1994) but regulation creates
lags and rigidities which bloc the fluidity or flexibility of the market. The paper
will also show leadership provided by the public sector in areas not necessarily
focused on tourism development, is what helped elevate (and maintain) France
as one of the most visited countries in the world, year in and year out.
Different investment choices and contrasting state policies lead to very differ-
ent consequences, as the fates of Battery Park (New York) and Canary Wharf
(London) have demonstrated (Fainstein, 1994). The implementation of the
Disneyland Paris project in France would have been impossible without the
planning culture and structures set up by the French government. Different
organisations have different capacities, roles and responsibilities. There is the
added pressure to perform well in a highly competitive dynamic market situa-
tion. Although it is tempting to advocate a particular form of governance in
supporting sustainable tourism development, most forms have evolved within
specific historical, cultural, legislative, economic and political contexts, and
would be resistant to radical transformations. A careful scrutiny of specific
examples can help to illustrate possible effective changes. Tourism, like central-
ised government, has a long history in France: it was first recognised as a separate
activity in the 1700s.This paper, however, will examine the French state’s interest
in tourism after World War II only.
The paper has three main parts. Part 1 shows why it is still relevant to discuss
national government intervention in tourism planning and development in
France and describes the French state’s interventionist policies. The French
state long preferred the top-down approach in support of large projects. This
situation is exemplified in Part 2 with a discussion of why the Disneyland Paris
theme park was built in France. This project happened because it could be
included in the Master Plan devised for the Paris Basin, and because of the
structures set up to ensure the implementation of the plan. The many criticisms
levelled at the French government for inserting this foreign project in the
French landscape were answered by mechanisms which have since
protected the area from unscrupulous activities the Walt Disney Company
might have reverted to in free market conditions. The state, however, has
withdrawn from interfering in many areas, in particular in large-scale tour-
ism planning, in favour of a bottom-up, community-oriented perspective
described in Part 3. Two forms of rural tourism are used as examples of local
intervention. The state’s retreat, though, is only partial and strategic. The
state still supports enterprises and activities that reflect or enhance national
interest or prestige.
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Part 1: The French State and Planning
A. Planning and the nation-state
In the United States, potential investments that are not directed at short-term
monetary gain are often criticised as ‘social’ investments, even though all invest-
ment takes place in a social context. State intervention can mitigate and contain
the conflict inherent in capitalist social relations … otherwise capitalism could
not avoid socialisation deficits, rationalisation failure, or spontaneity of econ-
omic crisis and sharpening of conflicts to the point of social and ecological catas-
trophe’ (Altvater, 1993: 13). The free market is not the only or even the most
sought after arena by private companies (even large ones) to invest in. Although
it can be argued that the private sector usually dominates the private/public
relationship through its command over investment choices, it depends heavily
on public sector decisions concerning investment in infrastructure, tax policy,
social relations and regulation of construction (Fainstein, 1994). Developers
themselves have sometimes wished for more state intervention. Oversupply of
built space is to noone’s advantage. The Walt Disney Company, at least initially,
requested the close cooperation of the French government to create its European
theme park near Paris.
The nation-state may not be the scale at which future institution building is
rooted (Bennett & Estall, 1991; Peck & Tickell, 1995: 26). The construction of
supra-national organisations like the European Union leads them to encompass
regions of similar economic activities within wider systems of political economic
interdependencies. The European Union, by forcing similar norms, favoured
France in its negotiations with the Walt Disney Company, for example, by
preventing Spain from offering lower interest rates. Certain regions could also
represent unique conjunctures within their national system. The European
Union has been more active in promoting tourism since the late 1980s, but,
whether it applies the older ‘equity’ philosophy or the more recent ‘free market’
one, most European aid funds would go to regions in countries other than France
because of its higher level of wealth than Spain, Greece, Portugal or Ireland. The
political system of capitalist society, however, was and is bound up with the
nationality of the state. Borders mark the difference between inside and outside
and thus delimit a national territory over which a state has sovereignty
(Poulantzas, 1978) even if certain realities make national borders antiquated (e.g.
multinationals, forms of pollution, drug trade). The Walt Disney Company could
negotiate only with individual European governments in its search for a resort
site, and not with the European parliament.
Governments are restricted in space and are constituted by the total amount of
resources present in that space and by the quality of its environment. The ques-
tion, then, is how to manage within the same space, events that are shaped by
local decisions together with events that are shaped by outside strategies
(Fainstein, 1990, 1994; Gittell, 1994; Rencontres, 1992). The question also arises as
to how to marry economic efficiency and social justice (Judd & Parkinson, 1990;
Storper & Scott, 1992; Thrift, 1994). Many governments have identified plan-
ning as an appropriate device to address social objectives, environmental
protection, and landscape enhancement. Beauregard (1990) and Friedmann
(1987) emphasise the morality of planning, its goals of social justice and redistri-
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bution. They also underline that the planning role of system maintenance can be
expanded to include even more features of social policy formation.
Policy-makers have then attempted to capitalise on service-sector advantages,
including new leisure activities and real estate development (planning for tour-
ism has been attractivebecause tourist destinations combine these elements), as a
way of dealing with otherwise intractable economic and social problems in the
face of a continuing decline of manufacturing. All organisations involved in
economic development aim to influence behaviour, not just governments.
B. Interventionist policies of the French state
The state is an ensemble of agencies of legitimate coercion capable of
sustained purposeful action. The French state, in its role as legislator, has
sustained relations of production within the French economy. With or without a
master plan, housing, schools and hospitals will be required, as will networks for
water, gas and electricity, together with public transit systems and roadways
(Delouvrier, 1966; Ploegaerts, 1986). In other words, policy decisions, legislative
measures and planning avoid future problems caused by otherwise disjointed
and incremental responses. The French state and its representatives believed in
state intervention and state planning. In 1956, the state started a programme of
industrial decentralisation for which it created the Délégation à l’Aménagement du
Territorie et à l’Action Régionale in 1963 (commission for land management and
regional action). DATAR was the tool, until 1974, to redistribute the benefits
generated by economic wealth through land development and land use policies.
It concentrated on moving industrial companies out of Paris (200,000 jobs) gener-
ating 300,000 new ones in the Province between 1956 and 1974 (Rochefort, 1996:
48). It also developed urban plans (Schémas Directeurs d’Aménagement Urbain –
SDAU) for major urban areas and later for smaller ones. These plans included the
implementation of New Towns based on ZADs (Zones d’Aménagement Differé).
In France, the government’s concern with planning relies on effective control
of the organisation of space. Planning has developed as an intellectual move-
ment in France since the nineteenth century. This movement has considered that
the public interest ‘… is the responsibility of the government to monitor, organ-
ise and encourage the construction of a container for society’s and economic life’
(GIE, 1993: 53). A committee for the expansion of Paris was established by the
Prefect of the Seine as early as 1910. However, it took the proponents of planning
50 years to convince the public and the legislature of the need to take the collec-
tive interest into account in questions of housing and land development
(Gaudin, 1985). It did lead to the creation of the Prost Plan for the Paris area
(1934), the first official plan to cover a major city, which served as a basis for the
1960 Plan pour le Développement et l’Organisation Générale de la Région Parisienne
(PADOG). French legislators had voted the 1943 law establishing an authoritar-
ian system of centralised, government controlled planning. It lasted for 40 years,
and the 1967 Pisani law barely modified it. Between 1960 and 1980, France was
flourishing economically and the future seemed assured thanks to state plan-
ning.
The PADOG was a mid-term plan (40 years) to control the growth of the Paris
conurbation. It was based on more than 15 years of dialogue with local authori-
ties. Three of the main urban nuclei that it suggested creating in the suburbs now
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exist, notably La Défense, West of Paris. The present Regional Express Rail (RER,
one line of which gives access to Disneyland Paris) and motorway networks
follow the palimpsest it had set up. It also provided the basis for planning public
utilities and amenities in the suburbs. It was part of an attempt to remedy the
functional inadequacies of high rise apartment blocks. The decree of 31 Decem-
ber 1958 founded priority urban development zones (ZUPs, Zones Urbaines
Prioritaires) one of the first major instruments for long-term planning, ancestors
of deferred development zones (ZADs) and other mechanisms which enabled
the government to integrate the Disneyland project in the Paris Basin. By the mid
1960s, it became imperative to anticipate, stimulate and channel development
rather than halt or constrain growth. Policy-makers no longer refer to ‘plans’,
which impose a precise and rigid pattern on maps, but to schémas directeurs,
which organise future development along major axes. These axes are chosen on
the basis of operational urban development policies. The conclusion was also
reached that a balance between housing, employment and amenities could only
be achieved through large-scale, long-term projects. New Towns were the
cornerstone of the new planning philosophy.
The Paris Basin was the first to benefit but the DATAR extended the planning
principles to the provinces. Such control was becoming essential because of the
very precise locational demands of certain industries and the critical situation in
traffic, housing, and facilities in the majority of great conurbations. The idea of
entrainement (stimulating growth in chosen areas) was introduced as early as the
third plan (1958–61) and embodies a wide range of objectives such as the creation
of the most conducive spatial framework for the attainment of rapid economic
growth, economically efficient means of service provision, or the acceleration of
the diffusion of innovations into backward regions. The French New Town
project was established to also solve two of the main problems of planning:
purchasing adequate land resources and avoiding chaotic urbanisation of rural
areas (Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement Urbain de la Région Parisienne, SDAURP,
1966). Although it was not aimed at capturing tourism schemes, this project
could accept varied investments, including tourism directed ones, if they facili-
tated the economic growth of the New Town.
C. Planning for tourism development in France
Planning and development in France have always included tourism (CRE-
DOC, 1992; Py, 1996), which is considered from a broad perspective, not just an
economic one. International tourism symbolises globalisation. France has
always preferred a proactive role to promote its international presence. It has
also recognised the embeddedness of tourism in societal and global processes.
The French national Sixth Plan directed ‘the opening of our economy to the
outside world’ as its first priority (DATAR, 1970: 59), an initiative that enabled it
to consider investments in the Tunnel under the English Channel (or Chunnel),
and to accept foreign direct investments like the Disneyland Paris resort. France
has thus provided the enormous public funding necessary for the super express
railway system links to the Channel, integrating them in the French transport
system so they will contribute to the country’s economic growth. The state in
Great Britain has refused to fund similar links on its side of the Channel.
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The number of foreign visitors to France reached the 70 million mark in 1998,
60 million of whom came from Europe (Direction du Tourisme, 1999). Their
destinations and those of domestic visitors are unsurprisingly diverse given the
size of the country and the variety of its landscapes. Tourism employed 619,521
people in 1997, or 2.7% of the national labour force, and provided 5.1% of the
gross national product (GNP). Total consumption by domestic and international
tourists reached FF612.5 billion in 1998 (Direction du Tourisme, 1999). The French
spend 1.7% of all their private consumption on tourism (domestic and interna-
tional). Americans spend only 1% and Norwegians 7%. In 1990, investment in
tourism represented 4.1% of all investment in France (Durand et al., 1994). A little
more than half came from the private sector, 65% of which went into lodgings
(one-quarter to hotels and a little less than three-quarters to second homes).
One-third of this investment in lodging went into major maintenance (Durand et
al., 1994). Agribusiness exports and tourism help compensate the French trade
deficit, since 1969 for tourism, and in increasing amounts. Tourism contributed
FF71.7 billion net in 1998 (US$11 billion) (Direction du Tourisme, 1999).
French state actions can be divided into three main areas: regulation, financial
support, and land development. Tourism policy is overseen by several ministries
besides the one so nominated: Exterior and Interior ministries define trade and
commerce regulations. The Social Affairs and Work ministry determines
employment conditions. Rural tourism is dependent on the Agriculture minis-
try. Major infrastructural investments for tourism projects are often made as
parts of National Plans by ministries other than the tourism one. In the Xth Plan,
the Ministry of Tourism was responsible for only 27% of all funds allocated by
the state to tourism. This division could indicate a relatively low priority
accorded tourism development. The state, however, has pursued a consistent
policy direction even if it has not always been clear.
The state’s interest in tourism has a long history in France. Originally, in the
nineteenth century, the state was interested in the ‘money spent in the country’.
Legislators long favoured tourist arrivals and spending while they restricted
foreign travel and spending by French citizens. A National Tourism Office was
created in 1910, and in 1936 tourism had its own state secretariat. The first national
plan (1949–52) included the promotion of ‘destination France’ through the exten-
sion of the road network, the improvement of rail service, the construction of
20,000 hotel rooms and the refurbishment of 180,000. Some investments targeted
specifically for the development of tourism were included in the Vth Plan (1966–
70). Tax legislation is also used to encourage tourism investment (Journal Officiel,
1994). The best known is the Loi Pons, in favour of developments in the DOM,
TOM & POM (French overseas départements, territories and pays in the North
Atlantic, the Pacific and the Caribbean). Rural tourism is supported by similar
measures to encourage farmers to remain active on their farms.
The French government tries to avoid that public value be held captive to
private value or that developers bypass environmental legislation. ‘The diffi-
culty was not in finding space [for tourism developments] but in organising it to
avoid its degradation’ confirm Durand et al. (1994). The state carried out refores-
tation, mosquito eradication, water distribution and a variety of other pro-
grammes throughout the Vth Plan. It was the first time that the link between
tourism development and the need to protect the environment was underlined
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(Rapport Général, 1965). The decision was confirmed in the VIth Plan (1971–75),
which emphasised the need to counteract negative environmental impacts of
tourism but did not halt the development of the latter (Rapport, 1971). For the
French state, protecting nature is to prevent new activities from penetrating
certain rural areas too rapidly, while preserving the quality of open spaces in
those threatened by desertification (Rochefort, 1996).
The French state recognised that landscapes are the major resource of tourism
that thus commodifies public free goods. The protection of nature, which
includes landscapes, was embodied in the law of 7 January 1983, and reaffirms
the importance of nature as part of French society’s heritage. It became necessary
to protect more landscapes from negative exploitation and degradation as illus-
trated by the Loi de la Montagne of 1985, and the Loi du Littoral of 1986. The state
established these planning programmes to encourage the creation of durable
landscapes and to avoid premature dereliction through easy abandonment.
Landscape includes the geographical meaning of ‘physical surroundings’ and
the ensemble of material and social practices: it is the entire panorama. It
connotes a contentious, compromised product of society, on which powerful
institutions have a pre-eminent capacity to impose their view: public entities as
well as capital, not just the latter.
National parks, created on the basis of a 22 July 1960 law, include not just natu-
ral but also ‘cultural features that, combined, offer respite, leisure opportunities
and tourist attractions, and which thus deserve to be both protected and organ-
ised’ (Durand et al., 1994:41). The state has sought to enhance the quality of land-
scapes (paysages), both naturaland cultural and found that protecting historically
relevant cultural sites could lead to cooperation across local authorities. Heritage
site development is also incorporated in economic development programmes.
The emphasis, the French state has affirmed, is on ensuring, or at least not sacri-
ficing, socially equitable and environmentally sustainable development on the
altar of job creation and capital accumulation to avoid that improvement explic-
itly reject the social variety of habitation and functions or explicitly seek security
by exclusion (CFNG, 1996).
D. State tourism development projects
The state has supported other tourism projects besides Disneyland Paris
through land management agencies linked to DATAR, in particular through
tourism government missions. These missions grouped members of different
ministries to ensure the synchronised development of coastal areas to attract
more foreign visitors as well as domestic ones. One concerned the coastal area of
the Languedoc-Roussillon along the western Mediterranean Sea – MIATLR
(Mission Interministérielle d’ Aménagement Touristique du Languedoc Roussillon), the
other the coast along the Aquitaine, on the Atlantic Ocean south of Brittany –
MIACA (Mission Interministérielle d’Aménagement de la Côte Aquitaine). They were
created in 1963 and 1967 respectively, for a period of 20 years each.
MIATLR constructed 7 coastal resorts and 14 marinas. It reforested thousands
of hectares, eradicated mosquitoes and supported the construction of limited
access roads to link the new resorts with the national road network. It transformed
this originally inhospitable coastal zone into spaces for the relaxation of domestic
tourists, 6.7% of whom visited the area in 1970. In 1990, 12.1% of domestic tourists
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frequented the area. Total visitor numbers increased from 525,000 in 1965, to 14.4
million in 1994, 27.5% of whom were foreigners (Baleste, 1989; Clary, 1993;
Ministère de l’Environnement, 1995). It aimed to diversify the economy of the
region until then too reliant on wine production, providing 30,000 new jobs by
1985. The economic effects have been seen as essentially positive. It also success-
fully relieved some of the congestion along the Côte d’Azur (Tuppen, 1991).
MIACA subsidised a supply of 200,000 beds, doubled the supply of camping
sites and participated in the development planning of several areas, but it
encountered resistance against governmental purchase of land from local
communities and especially from local residents who owned forested estates:
they wanted to preserve their large hunting domains. The government could not
then protect the area from land speculation. The project to link the various water
bodies of the area by a canal had to be abandoned for technical reasons while
many small private developments and secondary homes sprouted along the
coast at the expense of social programmes. Protection of the dunes has suffered
too (Baleste, 1989; Clary, 1993). The area still attracted 8.8% of domestic tourists
in 1990 up from 7.5% in 1970 (Clary, 1993).
The state has disengaged from major tourism projects along the Mediterra-
nean coast since the late 1980s and relies on the application of national legislation
by local governments. One of these laws (10 July 1975) did create a national
Conservatory of Lake and Sea Shore Space (Conservatoire du Littoral et des Rivages
Lacustres) to facilitate the acquisitionof sensitive coastalareas and to reduce spec-
ulative hoarding, in response to criticisms against increasingly visible damage to
the environment. Between 1976 and 1994 42,284 ha had been bought and 51,222
as of 1 September 1997, representing 705 km of shoreline. Some coastal land-
scapes have been restored in partnership with local authorities and private
donors. Other laws guarantee free public access to all beaches whether along the
sea or along a lake shore: a three metre-wide swath for passage along the beach
and paths from the main public ways to the beaches must be provided through
private land along the coast (Lanquar, 1995). Corsica has refused all forms of
state tourism planning for its coastal areas.
From the early 1960s, the notion of culture became increasingly idealised in
public discourse and came to replace leisure. The state has also been more preoc-
cupied to guarantee the security of its citizens and of public order than to organ-
ise its leisure activities. Even though French economic prosperity began to be
seriously threatened in the 1980s and unemployment and social costs were
deemed to be far too heavy, France held its original perspective and continued to
increase its spending on cultural matters (Poujol, 1993). Nearly half was devoted
to conservation and to the promotion of the cultural heritage. The state also
invested heavily in large projects such as the Pompidou centre, the Musée
d’Orsay, the Louvre renovations, the Bastille Opera, and, most recently, the
mega National Library. They have all become major tourist attractions:for exam-
ple, Orsay received 2,724,000 visitors in 1998.
The Ministry of Culture created in 1959 (for André Malraux) has had the
mission to conserve, rehabilitate and enhance the national cultural heritage and
to broaden its audience. Since the mid 1980s, the state and local authorities have
played a major role in the touristic development of this heritage, in response to
strong demand. Cultural tourism brings in 15% of all tourism induced revenues
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and provides 145,000 jobs. The government has tried to inflect a sustainable form
of development to reconcile site protection, touristic exploitation and economic
growth. Such a delicate balance is perpetually threatened by severe competition
and increasing financial requirements. Sustainable development is also based on
contemporary models and concepts, which can rapidly become obsolete. It is
difficult to integrate future mutations or ruptures. Sustainable development
does have a pedagogical function, to sensitise local residents as well as tourism
operators and government representatives and to encourage these groups to
negotiate when their interests and beliefs diverge (Patin, 1997).
Cultural tourism programmes in France have always included both nature and
culture following a long history of protection of the country’s cultural heritage.
The first law for the conservation of historic monuments was established on 30
March 1887, and on 13 December 1913 a new law established the norms for regis-
tration as well as a classification system. On 2 May 1930, a law was created to
extend the registration and classification system to any natural site that is pictur-
esque, artistic (was painted by an artist), historic and legendary, or even scientific.
Laws voted in 1983 and in 1993, ensure the protection and restoration of urban or
rural spaces that demonstrate a high architectural or landscape quality: these
ZPPAUP (zones de protection du patrimoine architectural urbain et paysager) exist in 85
different areas, covering 5500 ha. Protected sites belong mostly to local authorities
(61%) or to private entities (29%) (Patin, 1997). The state owns only 6% of the sites
and monuments managed by the Caisse nationale des monuments historiques et des
sites, which was founded in 1914 and the DATAR, through its mission of conceiv-
ing and implementing national policies of development, is one of the main agents
involved in the touristic commodification of French cultural heritage.
Bauer (1996) reproaches the French state for under representing ethnographic
aspects of its national heritage. Elements of popular or folk culture are conspicu-
ously absent from the list of state recognised heritage attractions. This may be
due in part to the strong interest by the French state in asserting a single national
culture in response to devolution by Brittany, Corsica and Basque country
(Wood, 1997). Recent efforts, responding to the demand for more rural based
tourism, provide visitors with eco-museums, where past practices are animated
among collections of artefacts, festivals and picturesque villages (often protected
under the ZPPAUP law). Gastronomyhas been most popular: Versailles hosted a
culinary exhibition, Tables royales de Catherine II à Marie Antoinette (Royal tables
from Catherine II to Marie-Antoinette), at the end of 1993 and into early 1994,
which accommodated 299,055 visits.
E. Social tourism
France is one of the few countries in the world that has developed such a
sector, which provided, in 1994, 9% of all tourist beds and serviced 1.5 million
people (Durand et al., 1994). The ability to take vacations away from home is still
not a reality for a large part of the French population, either because it lacks suffi-
cient disposable income or because destinations are not equipped for that clien-
tele. The percentage of the French who could not go away for a vacation has
decreased over time from 56.4% in 1964 to 31.3% in 1996. Three main reasons
prevent them from travelling: deliberate choice (though often shadowed by
‘economic’ worries), budget constraints (53%) or family constraints (30%)
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(Observatoire, 1998). Physically challenged people also have difficulty finding
accommodations that are accessible and that can cater to their needs.
A number of instruments exist to facilitate such departures but the govern-
ment is examining their validity. Until 1984, the government subsidised the
construction of family lodgings and holiday villages reserved for the beneficia-
ries of social programmes. Very few were built between 1985 and 1990, so that
60% of them needed to be renovated by 1990 and 30% had to be demolished
(CEDAET, 1992; Observatoire, 1998). The government continues to support the
training of employees required to run these establishments. The political aim is
still to reduce social inequities and to minimise social exclusion. The groups
denied vacations away from home have changed: young working class families
have been replaced by those on long-term unemployment, the elderly, as well as
families or individuals not socially integrated. The government is also examining
access to tourist destinations by handicapped people.
Financial aid (in the form of travel stamps) from the government to families,
instituted in 1982, amounted to FF887 million (US$1774.4 million) in 1994, and
FF1.92 billion (US$384 million) in 1995, and benefited some five million people
(Py, 1996). The government has encouraged the use of travel stamps because it
also generates multiplier effects. The checks mean money is spent on a variety of
economic activities which, in turn, have fostered a threefold increase in spend-
ing. The handling of the state funds has been decentralised since 1986, so the
organisation of vacations is in the hands of regional Caisses d’Allocations even if
they are still funded by the state. Regions now have to finance much of this form
of tourism so that only four had retained it in their contract with the state under
the IXth Plan (1984–1988). Much of the help now goes to participation in local
leisure activities that permit better social integration within the community
rather than to vacation travel.
Social tourism long relied on voluntary labour. The problem today is to recon-
cile social aims with economic viability since the state is reducing all subsidies.
Various nonprofit associations managed 285,000 beds in 1993, or a little less than
3% of all tourism beds. Only Belgium and Denmark, within the European Union,
also provide this form of tourism, but they each offer one-tenth (Belgium) and
one-twentieth (Denmark) the number of beds. Demand for social tourism seems
to be more seasonal than for other forms of tourism partly because volunteers are
tied to school vacation schedules but mostly because the sun, sand and surf
remain major attractions. Some of the structures have been used to foster
economic development of the surrounding area since they are located in regions
less frequented by more wealthy visitors. Because demand for tourism products
has changed, nonprofit associations have had to compete with other tourism
organisers to attract visitors. For some of these associations, this has led to the
loss of their nonprofit status.
Part 2: Disneyland Paris
A. The conditions for a French state/Walt Disney Company cooperation
The Walt Disney Company had been looking for an overseas location for new
theme parks since the mid 1970s. It had been dismissed by the French govern-
ment in 1976. By the early 1980s, comforted by the success of its franchise in
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Japan, it had conceived the notion of large real estate developments based on
complete tourist resorts (Flower, 1991). ‘Disney is a real-estate enterprise which
must exploit its holdings to the last square inch, without giving competition the
slightest break’ affirmed its then CEO, M. Eisner, in a press conference defending
the company’s penetration of the French market. Walt Disney Company’s plans
which ambitiously combined tourist and urban functions, i.e. theme parks and
other attractions together with offices, hotels, retail shops, housing, and sports
complexes, required considerable space. It had already recognised the signifi-
cant advantages of a site in the New Town of Marne-La-Vallée: available acreage
and easy accessibility to the whole European market.
The spatialmediation of cultural consumption, just like industrial production,
affects the redistribution of benefits among social classes and explains the direct
interest of the French government in a Disney theme park, and its offer of the
Marne-La-Vallée location. For the French government, Disney’s project would
create an urban growth pole economically independent of Paris. Gaston Deferre,
the Mayor of Marseille, had hoped the Walt Disney Company would choose a
site in Camargue since ‘ . . . such a large project would represent a major economic
boost and many profitable investments for the region, a shot of oxygen for
construction and public works’ (quoted in Burlet, 1987). The competitive edge of
the French government to capture the Disney investors was by means of product
differentiation, offering a space they enhanced through design and designation.
Public authorities must have a very long-term vision to anticipate development
needs decades ahead, to control the space required and its accessibility. It is also a
matter of the cultural context, whether it favours a neo-liberal versus a more
socialist approach to government.
The French government is renowned for its complexity, its bureaucracy, and
its layers of state and local governments, in spite of which very practical solu-
tions were devised. Altogether there were 36 different delegates on the French
side of the table when negotiations started since the French government was
extremely secretive about its dealings. It encouraged the Walt Disney Company
to make as many contacts as possible among the various public authorities, and
to play them against each other until Michel Gifaud, responsible for the region of
Ile de France, demanded that the state designate one representative to speak
for all. The various parties to the French side of the negotiations eventually
agreed upon a single negotiator. Continuity in policies and in the negotiations
was maintained through various government (and political party) changes
(Rencontres, 1992).
The main characteristic of the Disneyland project is that it is a public–private
partnership (i.e. the government and the private company each assume those
risks and responsibilities that are specifically theirs). This is fundamentally
different from a mixed economy where the government and the private
company take on risks and responsibilities together. A contractwas signed, at the
behest of the company, on 24 March 1987, between the French government (six
public partners: the state, the Ile de France region, the Seine et Marne
Département, the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), EPAMarne,
and EPAFrance – see explanations on these last two below) and a private society
that the Walt Disney Company would create, Eurodisney SCA (Société en
Commandite par Actions, a company listed on the stock market). This Convention
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(1987) was signed to permit the development of 1943 ha, according to a detailed
plan (mise en oeuvre opérationelle through a Projet d’Intérêt Général) that would
follow in spirit and to the letter the planning philosophies of the state described
above. The Convention determines the duties and responsibilities of each part-
ner, not just those of the French government, which critics have often confused
with concessions to the Walt Disney Company.
In 1992, the Walt Disney Company criticised the rigidity of the convention. It
won some minor concessions, but none concerning the timetable or the
urbanistic demands. Basic laws of urbanism, which are embodied in the Projet
d’Intérêt Général (that part of the plan that governs land use development by
Eurodisney SCA) cannot be modified, whether they are included in a contract or
not. The French government never lost control in this domain. EPAFrance was
created (on the basis of article L321–1 of the Code de l’Urbanisme) specifically to
protect the public and the local governments, who would be heavily impacted by
the project. This Etablissement Public d’Aménagement (EPA) would also guarantee
the coherent development of such a large area through a well-coordinated public
sector. The boards of trustees of the EPAs include mostly elected officials. The
EPA in charge of developing the New Town of Marne-La-Vallée (EPAMarne)
continues to maintain the balance sought for in the original Convention and to
remind Eurodisney SCA of its obligations. Minor modifications must be compat-
ible with the letter of the Projet. Major modifications would require the renegoti-
ation of the Convention and of the urban plans the Projet d’Intérêt Général is
based on (EPAFrance, 1994; Rencontres, 1992).
Marne-La-Vallée is such a large New Town that it has been divided into four
sectors. Disneyland is in sector IV. A new Etablissement Public d’Aménagement
was created to direct the development of sector IV and thus of the Disney park,
EPAFrance. The government invested FF2.7 billion for the development of the
park for a total private investment of FF23 billion. Some of the infrastructure built
with this capital services more than the park. The Regional Metro Lines – RER –
service sectors III and IV; the Trains à Grande Vitesse – TGV, fast trains – station is
to be used by the whole of the New Town; water supply, sewers, highway exits
were constructed for the whole of sector IV. The government had also commis-
sioned a cost/benefit analysis to help in its decision-making, as well as an envi-
ronmental impact statement (SETEC, 1985, 1986, 1987; EPAMarne, 1988; Institut
d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région d’Ile de France (IAURIF), 1988).
B. Structures that governed the implementation of the Disney project
Policies were adopted in the early 1970s to guarantee the availability of the
needed acreage even though the Walt Disney Company project was unknown
and the company signed a letter of intent only as of 18 December 1985.A policy of
anticipatory funding or long-term investment under government supervision
was initiated together with land price control policies to channel development in
the periphery of urban areas under the DATAR. Deferred development zones, or
ZADs, permit land to be pre-empted long before it is purchased, 8600 ha in the
case of the New Town of Marne-La-Vallée (GIE, 1993). These were linked to
immediate public land purchases of exceptionally wide scope (4770 ha in
Marne-La-Vallée), in order to preserve future options and subsequently
re-invest the increased value of the land in the construction of the new towns.
132 Current Issues in Tourism
These initiatives were made possible by the creation of the land and technical
service agency for the Paris region (AFTRP), which was established in 1961
(Livre Blanc, 1992). Because the government was quick to pay for the land,
compulsive purchase was avoided. Similar plans were adopted in New Towns
and other development projects elsewhere in France.
An issue confronted by the two sides was the preferential price at which
Disney could buy the 1943 ha, especially since some writers believed that the
company could then sell or rent the land as it deemed profitable. Some critics also
declared that the government had to buy more land than the company would
ever pay for. Eurodisney SCA (the owner of the Walt Disney Company project in
the Paris Basin, project which will eventually include much more than the
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Figure 1 Location of Disneyland Paris in Marne-La-Vallée
Disneyland or Magic Kingdom Park) has tried several times to replace the EPA,
but French laws do not allow private companies to initiate development.
EPAFrance represents all public authorities in negotiations with Eurodisney
SCA. The size of the Disney project and the amount of land it required, one of the
largest development projects in France in the 1980s, was another major source of
criticism (Lanquar, 1992).Walt Disney Company chose the Paris Basin (in spite of
its damp cool winters) because the French government was the only European
one that could readily provide such a large acreage.
The EPA is the master builder of the secondary infrastructure, for the French
government, not simply as Disney’s proxy. Its work is defined by the revenues it
raises from the improved lots it sells to the Walt Disney Company, or to other
investors in this sector of the New Town of Marne-La-Vallée. The price of indi-
vidual lots is based on four elements:
(1) The agreed basic price of the agricultural land (US$8000 per acre). That is the
purpose of the New Towns who purchase land tracts 25 years before any
development appears, and thus without assurance that it will occur, to buy
land before its value has appreciated.
(2) Cost of the secondary infrastructure built by the state or its representative (for a
total of FF1.5 billion in 1995).
(3) Financial costs: the agreement restricts the land’s price from increasing with
the inflation rate even though Disney was given 20 years to complete all the
land purchases. Nonetheless Disney was to cover the financial expenses of
maintaining idle real estate to alleviate their fears of uncontrollable price
increases.
(4) Expenses for general improvement (EPAFrance, 1994; EPAMarne, 1987). Thus,
1+2+3+4 represents the total amount charged Eurodisney SCA, FF530m2, or
an average of $400,000per acre (not $5000as mentioned in Flower, 1991:208;
Grover, 1991;Lipietz, 1987;Smadja, 1987). Eurodisney SCA also contributed
payments towards the TGV station (FF200 million), the RER station (4
million) and the national electricity provider (EDF) for underground high
voltage cabling (20 million) (EPAFrance, 1994).
The French government set up regulations to ensure that speculative hoard-
ing would not occur. The timetable of development was the foremost concern
of French authorities. The state provides the secondary infrastructure neces-
sary within a predetermined timeframe, and its cost is included in the selling
price of the land. The French government has always provided public regional
and primary infrastructure in all the New Towns. Should the Disney Company
have withdrawn before the opening of the Magic Kingdom, or had it closed its
doors in March 1994 if negotiations for the financial restructuring of the
venture failed, the infrastructure would have remained as support to other
investors in the New Town. The Company accepts to develop specific plots of
land, within prescribed time limits, following urban and architectural direc-
tives (for example, housing and hotels must offer different levels of accommo-
dations). Once EPAFrance has made an offer, the company must respond by a
pre-established deadline. In case of delays, Eurodisney SCA loses rights to
one-third of the land not developed by the due date. Eventually, it can lose all of
its rights (EPAFrance, 1994).
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C. Was the Disneyland Paris project worth capturing?
Most publications on Disneyland Paris in the 1980s and early 1990s denote
how a capitalist corporation seemed to dominate transactions with public
authorities (Walker, 1995), and how the French government seemed to have
bowed to the Walt Disney Company’s every demand (Flower, 1991; Grover,
1991; Lanquar, 1992; Lipietz, 1987). It represented an ‘unquestionable national
surrender to a private foreign power’ for Smadja (1987: 98). Had the French state
opted for a simulacrum of urbanism in the eastern part of the Paris Basin? Plans
had been submitted to the public. Paul Delouvrier has painstakenly tried to
demonstrate that the planning process in France was democratic from its incep-
tion, through the use of public opinion polls and the publication of population
projections and of the needed infrastructure (GIE, 1993: 35), even though from
the state’s perspective, the practice of the democratic process, of interactive
participation, can reduce the efficacy of a project. Plans for the Paris Basin 2000
project were presented in 150 public lectures, in mass media reports and in four
books, but democratic interactive participation was not encouraged. Consulta-
tion had occurred with the 130 mayors of the area and their 20,000 councillors,
various trade and industry organisationsand associationsof architects and town
planners.
Local developers recognised that Disneyland Paris seemed to represent a
fantastic opportunity. On the other hand, ‘as it stimulates large numbers of
projects, it is increasing the risks in the region, for hotels and other services: risk
of excess capacity, first, risk that the resort’s spillover effects be less than
expected . . . leading to profits for Disney only’ declared a critic (Robert, 1990).
The company offered an injection of capital and of specific activities that can
encourage other investors to build the missing elements. As an official explained:
‘Disney guarantees us notoriety and invaluable credibility with international
CEOs. The Walt Disney Company could not have chosen Marne-La-Vallée by
chance’ (Vachez, 1989). Investment is the motor of growth, it ‘ . . . is the critical
element in the addition of new capacity, the application of new equipment, the
opening up of new product lines, the creation of new firms, and so forth’ (Walker,
1995: 189). The government’s New Town Plan for Marne-La-Vallée has sched-
uled a more balanced form of development for the park’s periphery, a diversified
urban node, which includes a university. The objectives of the plan have been
realised in the total new town of Marne-La-Vallée (e.g. Cité Descartes, in sector
III houses the university).
Criticisms often spring from a notion of ‘capital versus the regions’, where
foreign corporationsare seen to exploit available resources and then abandon the
area when resources are exhausted or cheaper alternatives are identified else-
where. The Walt Disney Company could not just close the doors of its Magic
Kingdom Park when it was threatened with bankruptcy in 1994.The Convention
that the company signed in March 1987, stipulated that if the project were aban-
doned by the company before completion, it would have had to pay the EPA to
bulldoze all that had been erected to clear the site for other urban investments. It
also had to offer financial guarantees over three years to the French government
to indemnify local authorities if it abandoned its project (EPAFrance, 1994). The
construction of a TGV station close to the resort was designed to reduce crowd-
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ing in Paris stations, and was constructed at the request of the French govern-
ment; it was not a response to a company command.
Some critics declared that Disneyland Paris could have been a growth pole
without government intervention or that other economic activities would have
engendered the same kind of spillovers (Eudes, 1992). The company could not
have assembled the acreage it required in the private market. Some of the major
communication links were planned for construction and were not built at the
behest of the company. Such infrastructure,however, would not have been avail-
able for at least a decade in the absence of plans for New Towns and of the requi-
site partnership between the Walt Disney Company and the French government.
The company might then have been swayed by the sunnier climate of Spain. If
the very point of a New Town is to attract inhabitants and businesses to a place to
which they would not otherwise have come at that particular time, it is obvious
that they will come only if attractive amenities are provided from the very start.
Substantial front-end investment is necessary to create a critical mass. Fainstein
(1990, 1994) demonstrated how the Docklands project failed because of the Brit-
ish government’s refusal to bolster the enterprise, including the construction of
infrastructure in advance of development.
There were some questionable concessions made by the French government,
especially in financial matters. However, many of these the company had to
relinquish at the time of the financial restructuration of the resort (March 1994)
without which it would have had to close. The greed of the company (excessive
debt leverage) caused much of its financial distress. The restructuration
happened only because the company’s short-term views were embedded in the
French government’s long-term plans. The Convention rescued the resort from
bankruptcy. Michael Eisner postured for Wall Street, swearing to close rather
than back down. The Walt Disney Company would not only have suffered a
major blow to its image, it would have faced huge costs (bulldozing its park). The
European banks did not feel as pressured during these negotiations. The axiom
that ‘ . . . if localities are on the march . . . it is to the tune of globalizing forces . . . a
process in which local stability is far from guaranteed’ (Amin & Malmberg, 1994:
242) was denied in Marne-La-Vallée by the Convention, part of the French
government’s development tools.
D. Criticising the interventionist role of government
Criticisms listed above are addressed against specific actions of the state that
seemed to give the Walt Disney Company, a foreign entity, unfair advantages.
The state had taken measures to counteract such consequences so they were
minimised. None of the criticisms, however, targets the policies that directed or
dictated those actions nor do they provide true solutions. The idea of state
planification, the objectives of the National Plans are never deconstructed or
criticised. The (political) distribution of power resulting from the cultural
constructs of the policies implemented by the state is never questioned. Policies
can have major impacts on the economic, cultural, and social organisation of the
targeted area. No criticisms address all of these consequences for the eastern part
of the Paris Basin. The production of touristic spaces competes with other func-
tions and other uses of space. As one form of territoriality is imposed, those
included get confronted to those excluded or hardly integrated who seek to gain
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access to the newly defined power structure (Violier, 1999). No critic, for exam-
ple, investigated whether plans for the New Town displaced long-term lower
class residents of this region. The critics of the cultural impact of a foreign icon in
Marne-La-Vallée were concerned with French culture in general, not its local
manifestations, or facilitation thereof. Environmental consequences were hardly
mentioned (d’Hauteserre, 1999).
Foucault has denounced how ‘political technologies’ have been used by the
state to conceal its own operation. They have effectively deflected the critics of
the Disneyland project from discovering who really benefited from embracing
that project and who lost. Individuals who participated in decisions to imple-
ment the Walt Disney Company project were able to objectify the need for plan-
ning through the application of universalised ideas or objectives. The language
used attempted to persuade the French public of the necessity to control its
economic development through land use decisions rather than inform it. The
position presented by the representatives of the state was ‘held to be exemplary
in some way’ (Apthorpe, 1997: 45). Who can oppose ideals of ‘equity’ and ‘envi-
ronmental protection’? The display of expert knowledge collectivised responsi-
bility for the decisions adopted, circumventing direct critiques. The regions that
have signed cooperative contracts with the state within the framework of the
XIth Plan, reiterating the state’s original position, have all assigned tourism the
role of stimulating economic and employment growth in their area, even where
tourism had been a minor activity.
Few criticisms have been published since the financial restructuring of
Eurodisney SCA. Studies about its spillover effects confirmed its positive contri-
bution to the localeconomy and to government coffers at all levels (d’Hauteserre,
1997). The company itself recorded profits only after 1995 and these have grown
slowly since, muting all complaints about excessive earnings. The company had
also complied with many of the directives of the Convention, purchasing and
hiring within the Paris Basin (Articles 22 and 23 of the Convention). It also collab-
orated with the local unions about its demands for personal grooming, dress
code and wage scales, and perhaps ‘left intellectuals, if not actually embracing
capitalism as the best of all possible worlds, hope for little more than a space in its
interstices and look forward to only the most local and particular resistances’
(Meiksins Wood, 1995: 1). Assessing the array of forces that cause change, deter-
mining how one can intervene, and imagining the kinds of possibilities that
should be made realities are difficult propositions in the best of times. The
current backlash against affirmative actions, immigrants and feminist move-
ments, together with the surge of fundamentalism and of nationalism across the
world, make energised critical analysis and oppositional politics extremely diffi-
cult.
Partnerships between the private and the public sector on the French model
have attracted attention. A comparative study was commissioned by DIFU to
determine their relevance for Germany (Ascher, 1994). Some partnerships have
sprung up in other countries. Bassett (1996) and Hastings (1996) describe some of
those in existence in Great Britain. These have been considered ‘fundamental’ to
the success of urban rehabilitation projects by the government although it has not
explained why. These partnerships, however, are usually concerned with much
smaller projects (individual housing estates or parts of urban renewal pro-
The Role of the French State 137
grammes) than in France. Thrift (1994) discusses the public/private partnership
in the Netherlands that has led the Randstadt to become a major global metropo-
lis. Van der Valk and Faludi (1992) cite France’s ‘New Towns’ as a model for
large-scale partnerships in sustainable urban and economic (re)development.
Planning for the future, Marne-La-Vallée intends to reinforce the office node
of Porte de Paris and to distribute widely the spillover effects of the Disneyland
Paris resort in Val d’Europe. Phase II of the Disney resort is in its construction
stage. The French government has also exported the expertise acquired through
experience by the members of the EPAs (établissements publics d’aménage-
ment). They created a groupe d’intéret économique, GIE Villes Nouvelles de France,
which, for example, in 1991 at the request of the Chinese, drew plans for the
mega-redevelopment of the Lujiazul sector of Shanghai. It is to become the ‘city
of the twenty-first century’, a futuristic financial hub for China and the whole
Pacific region (Olds, 1995: 1732).
Part 3: The Role of Local Government
A. Deregulation and local government involvement
In the 1960s,policies were conceived and planned by the stateand imposed on
local communities. After 1976, flexibility was introduced. In 1982–83, the laws of
decentralisation ‘signalled’, not a withdrawal of the state, but a pull-back in
favour of local action, financially supported by the state (Clary, 1993: 39) in the
form of planning contracts (contrats de plan) between the state and the newly
created regions. By the early 1990s the state was disengaging from investing in
heavy infrastructure for tourism partly because economic returns were slow in
materialising. The recession also reduced the availability of funds so the state
could no longer act effectively in all areas. It abandoned the idea of a national
purpose in land use control. Local communities now initiate tourism develop-
ment programmes. Deregulation, however, does not necessarily mean greater
autonomy. The market sets its own parameters. Government regulations are not
simply restrictive. Planning policy may constrain opportunities but it also
creates new ones: ‘natural’ out door recreation areas exist in Western Europe
because governments deliberately protect these areas.
The accent was put on more efficient management of the existing structures
and on greater participation by all stakeholders in the projects. A shift had
occurred from the acceptable predominance of sovereignty-law-repression to
the development and diffusion of more subtle and economic forms of power,
exercised over life, over individuals and populations. Foucault explained this
shift as ‘governmentalisation’ of the state whereby sovereignty, the object of
which is the preservation of territory became uncoupled from government that
focuses on the human condition. The French government has been among the
slower ones to adopt this paradigm shift. Three centuries of centralised bureau-
cracy, reinforced by the tight control required to manage Fordist production
mean that, even in its most liberal hour, French capitalism remains in the hands
of the state. It has been reluctant to adopt post-Fordist principles of development
until forced by recessionary economic circumstances.
The Xth Plan (1989–1993) was to favour destinations returning a high rate of
value added rather than those simply increasing the numbers of visitors. The
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social consensus on major infrastructural funding had softened. The new role of
the state was to act as designer, coordinator and leader, creating an environment,
defining an urban context, and stimulating initiatives. Local actors have been
encouraged to respond more effectively to increased competition through
improved relations between quality and price. The DATAR has not disappeared.
It handles smaller projects and seeks cooperation with the newly established
regions. Its objectives are to provide them with the means to develop their
comparative advantages within the context of European and world economic
competition. It supports, for example, the restoration of grands sites like the
Dune du Pyla along the southern Atlantic coast. The state still controls major
infrastructural decisions.
The old hegemonic societal paradigm was finally lifted, permitting those
competing (non-leftist) ideas that had been in the shadow of the dominant politi-
cal discourse to become incorporated in the new neo-statist paradigm and to
mute their opposition. The state will
‘… define and implement programs of national interest, either within a
given tourism sector (hotels, for example) or to coordinate large interre-
gional public works, or to act as a lever (subsidizing major studies or
promotional programs). The statecan also draw broad nationalpolicy deci-
sions for the development of tourism. Regions would implement those
programs previously started by the state that are of regional interest. They
would also coordinate all public decisions in regional tourism develop-
ment in accord with all other local authorities’ (Conseil National du
Tourisme (CNT), 1994).
Deregulation has been favoured by many governments but the French state
has difficulty relinquishing its authority. In the air transport area it has
regrouped its airlines to make them more competitive but has barely opened the
French market to foreign competition (Durand et al., 1994). Ile de France gained
regional autonomy only after the implementation of the law of 5 July 1993, even
though decentralisation policies had been adopted in 1982–83. The state has
moved from a visibly active to a more passive and diffuse involvement in the
planning and development of tourism. It has reserved the right to develop sites
of international repute and those that generate national prestige. In the late 1980s
it promoted French culture, its artefacts, and monuments as tourist attractions to
be managed competitively with other theme parks and attractions (Monnier,
1987). Castles, monuments and museums that have been registered and/or clas-
sified (as described in 1D above) are funded as aspects of cultural heritage.
The state opened the Maison de la France in 1987 as its international promo-
tional arm. It can thus coordinate the marketing actions of the different levels of
government as well as those of private operators. It concentrates its marketing
efforts on 11 countries: seven in Europe plus the United States, Japan, Canada
and Australia. The nation-state and tourism have a natural affinity since both
have an interest in constructing a place as unique and distinctive (Wood, 1997).
The French state’s interest in supporting international promotion through
Maison de la France is as much political as economic. Maison de la France has also
encouraged local actors and their representatives to participate in the national
‘Bonjour’ programme (for a friendly welcome of visitors) since its application can
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only occur at the local level by those who actually service visitors. It has, at the
same time, invested heavily in some products like Club Mediterranée, Accor,
Wagons-Lits, and Visit France through the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (the
very one who ‘subsidised’ Eurodisney SCA at below the market loan rates) to
create a tourism product mass competitive at the European scale.
Participation in the European Community will force the French state to adopt
a more liberal ideology. Europe has become an unavoidable partner so that
development programmes cannot exist only at the national scale. Within the
context of a spatially expanding European political framework, two main sectors
are developing. Greater local and regional autonomy can respond to this devel-
opment since local authorities should provide more flexible planning proce-
dures and greater knowledge of their environmental strengths. The first sector is
that of intra-regional leisure and recreation to satisfy the needs of local popula-
tions. Improvements in those areas benefit international visitors too (see nature
tourism and river tourism described further on). The second concerns long-haul
tourism concentrated along the pleasure periphery of Europe. Sustaining the
tourism product in those areasand elsewhere requires constant regeneration and
coordination among its different agents.
B. Distribution of competencies between levels of government
Leadership and vision are important in building local development capacity
together with a correct evaluation of the expected benefits. In order to manage its
territory the community must come up with a strategy to control investments
and land uses that it can oppose to private strategies. Public policy is important
and the public sector has a determining role in supporting local economic
growth, together with increased cooperation between the public and private
spheres in developing policies for the future (Gittell, 1994; Pagano & Bowman,
1995; Wilson, 1988). These authors also underline the need for a more encom-
passing local policy than just industrial recruitment. Leadership capacity (i.e.
effective institution building and policy-making) seems to be the main prerequi-
site to insure the viability of contemporary economically productive agglomera-
tions. French administrative partitioning, however, has changed little since
départements and communes were created following the 1789 Revolution. The
new regions are really only the more recent way of regrouping the départements
and they rarely correspond with the present socio-spatial organisation of the
country. There has been no attempt to restructure French public administration
on the basis of socio-economic regions.
Regional and local authorities are purported to be much closer to regional
problems and strengths than central agencies. This ‘reconstitution of national
and regional governance’ (McLeod & Jones, 1999) is to bring decision making as
close as possible to the location affected. It will also provide for more flexible
management of the majority of projects, which are of considerably smaller size
than the Disneyland resort. The national state is being hollowed out in favour of a
resurgence of local and regional governance. It also means that the regional and
social redistributive policies of the past are being replaced by supply-side initia-
tives to promote competitiveness. Although the French state has withdrawn
from direct management and sponsorship of many economic projects, it is not
withering away. It remains the key site for galvanising political discourse and
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maintaining social cohesion. It has, for example, retained its role of steering the
new interorganisational relations of governance.
The retreat of the state has sometimes meant the absence of an organising
power for local development, which leads local projects to grow in isolated fash-
ion or to the invasion by large commercial ventures. The reintroduction of a
hegemonic model would, however, be inappropriate. The new contractsof coop-
eration between the state and regions instituted in the Xth plan, are a response to
the need for the coordination of all levels of governance, coordination best
achieved by the regions. The law of 23 December 1992 distributes the role of each
layer of governance in tourism development. A 1994 evaluation of tourism
development found that in the case of both cultural attractions and natural sites,
there had been little attention paid to tourists’ needs: signs and facilities to direct,
service and welcome visitors were absent (CNT, 1994). National focus on major
projects, like the Disneyland resort, had bypassed local requirements. Local
communities involved in smaller programmes have thus suffered from lack of
economic spillovers.
These inadequacies explain in part the low level of spending of international
visitors in France. Few remain more than the one or two days required to cross
the country since there were insufficient amenities to delay them. The country
received 70 million visitors in 1998 who spent only US$29.7 billion. The United
States, on the other hand, received only 46.4 million visitors but they spent
US$71.1 billion. In Italy 34.8 million visitors spent US$30.4 billion (Direction du
Tourisme, 1999). The millions of visitors to the Loire Valley castles, for example,
have fostered little economic activity in the surrounding villages (Bauer, 1993).
The state has thus contracted to encourage spending on tourism projects by the
various regions, providing 45% of the FF1.705 million (US$320 million) allocated
in the XIth Plan. This investment is above and beyond that provided by various
land developing and activity supporting ministries (such as, for example, subsi-
dies to farmers to develop rural tourism in order to remain on the farm).
Since the vote on decentralisation, the French state has encouraged grass roots
development because of the fractal, chaotic and complex nature of tourist activi-
ties especially in rural areas and because different organisations have different
capacities, roles and responsibilities. It would also avoid stifling creativity, a
condition basic to the development of sustainable tourism (Goodey, 1997). It has
also recognised the need to support and coordinate a national tourism policy to
avoid anarchy and cumulative disinvestments, while encouraging positive
synergies. It has remained a major partner even if it now acts backstage rather
than on stage. The actions of the French state have confirmed Foucault’s perspec-
tive on the locations of power: ‘Power is not homogeneous but can be defined
only by the particular points through which it passes … power is local because it
is never global, but it is not local or localized because it is diffuse’ (in Deleuze,
1988: 25–6). Such diffuseness of power enables the state to maintain its presence
without visibility.
C. Limitations of local governments
Local authorities often depend on the private sector to finance most economic
expansion, and they have only very limited tools for attracting expansion. Local
authorities also often lack the financial means to implement or to impose their
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perspective on private development plans or must compete with a wide array of
localities for few projects. The New Towns in the Paris Basin were all vying for
the soccer stadium built for the World Cup, but only one (Sénart) could win.
Much investment is in the maintenance of the general infrastructure such as
transport arteries or the water supply, which are basic necessities for a quality
tourist experience. Some of the programmes contracted for in the XIth Plan
mention ‘quality’ for the first time. Local authorities have, however, little influ-
ence individually to direct tourist flows towards specific local attractions even
though National Plans designate them as the providers of such products since
local specificities do dictate local provision of tourism products.
Local governments must be willing to cooperate and set aside or modify strat-
egies and priorities that are conflicting. Only 30% of local communities have
organised as associations in order to avoid competition: the association collects
taxes from the private companies that invest locally and redistributes the reve-
nues to all of its members. Some links have been established to coordinate local
and national public authorities because they all have different powers, not
perfectly aligned and sometimes jumbled. The law of 2 February 1995 tries to
divide clearly the respective competencies at each decision level and to put more
precisely some clear limits on the power of local governments. These different
levels of government meet several times a year to create synergies and to reach
development goals more efficiently. This articulation is extremely important
because larger projects generate a multitude of consequences while smaller ones
need to avoid duplication.
Although the state seems to withdraw its support (its financial contribution
has been judged inadequate (CNT, 1994)), it still requires attention to its original
dictates of planning for equity. These contractsmust follow five major objectives:
modernisation and efficiency, competitivity of French products and production,
rural and agricultural development, environment, quality of life and growth, as
well as social cohesion and prevention of exclusion (CNT, 1994). Another objec-
tive was to facilitate coordination with programmes of the European Commu-
nity. Transboundary inter-regional cooperation gives regions structuring
capacities and greater financial clout than individual regions can muster on their
own. The European Community favours such transboundary cooperation as it
counteracts individual state sovereignty. It also provided FF1.070 million
(US$170 million) to support such projects over the French Xth Plan, confirming
policies sketched in the late 1980s (Akehurst, 1993).
This articulation within the French state apparatus has facilitated some forms
of broad and systematic assessment, which underpin many tourism planning
decisions, to avoid repeating mistakes, as, for example, in the case of fluvial tour-
ism (see section E below). At the same time, programmes are continued simply
because they have been agreed to by local authorities. Regional leaders are reluc-
tant to innovate to avoid rounds of new negotiations with multiple local govern-
ments. Policies promoting physical redevelopment through public–private
partnerships were heralded as the key to economic success (Fainstein, 1994).
Different views exist on the required degree of regulation of these agents
(Turner, 1993). Resistance from market interests, the need to ensure the collabo-
ration of multiple agencies, the need for complementary measures and the
142 Current Issues in Tourism
competitive fears amongst local authorities can all tend to diminish the effective-
ness of regulation at the local level.
D. Redistribution of responsibilities in nature tourism
The organisationof nature tourism illustrates this new division of responsibil-
ities between the different levels of government following the implementation of
decentralisation laws. Nature tourism has seen increased numbers of partici-
pants because they prefer to spend less profligately on their vacations. Unfortu-
nately, political rivalries often interfere with cooperation, as was illustrated by
the distribution of the 1992 Winter Olympics venues over numerous communal
sites in the French Alps. At the state level, the Ministry of the Environment,
created in 1971, is in charge of national parks, of the protection of specific sites,
and the conservation of sea and lake coastal zones. The state has also created
natural reserves, some of which it has made accessible to the public, but perma-
nent constructions (including hotels) are prohibited. Access to the parks is paid
for through taxation. Their touristic attractionresides in their very existence. The
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Figure 2 Distribution of National and Regional Parks in France
French public does not tolerate commoditisationof these ‘social’ spaces even if it
has been proven that visitors are more respectful of facilities they have paid for
directly. The state also guarantees the legal strength of regulations concerning
environmental protection and conservation.
The French state has established legislation for the protection of natural areas
since the ninth century. More recently, laws have been voted since 1913 but they
have often been insufficiently applied or enforced. Local authorities have no
regulatory powers in environmental matters. Financing is scheduled at the
departmental level, but it is unevenly distributed and penalises the more rural
areas since earnings come from a tax on construction permits. Financing from the
state is available only if the site benefits from special protection statutes. In the
early 1990s, the French state adopted a policy of enhancement, through the
Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Tourism, of certain landscapes,
called Grands Sites, to halt their degradation due to poorly organised and exces-
sive visitation. The very existence of these specific sites is socially constructed.
Together, they represent the varied landscapes of the ‘beautiful French country-
side’. Their ‘touristification’ is a result of their renown which attracts large
numbers of visitors, in turn, confirming their ‘greatness’ and hence their
attractivity to ever larger numbers. They are targeted as representative of the
whole region they are located in. Their upgrade should benefit their surround-
ings.
These sites are different from Natural Parks which are considered to be
ecological domains, another form of social construction also vulnerable to
‘touristification’. The policy is to raise the quality of the grands sites experience
through controlled visitor flows, protection of some of its features, organisation
of the ‘welcome’ (parking, information, interpretation, itineraries, and other
services) and provision of overnight accommodations nearby. These are needed
to ensure economic benefits to the area. The idea of charging for these services is
slowly making headway in France. This initiative really aims at encouraging
local authorities to band together to maintain and control the grands sites. The
partnership can also include all private organisations concerned with the exploi-
tation of the site. The purpose is to generate economic benefits that would then
spread over a wide area. These ‘Grands Sites’ (in 1993, 27 of them had been identi-
fied and supported) should become magnets that attract visitors to the region
who can then be redirected to other smaller regional attractions (Ministère de
l’Environnement, 1993).
The 1982–83 decentralisation laws have given the 22 regions and 96
départements the ability to create regional natural reserves (31 existed in 1996)
and to raise taxes to finance their maintenance (for example taxes on certain
construction permits). Some départements have set up walking and trekking
itineraries through their territories. Posted signs, information kiosks and maps
are available to guide users of these trails. Some of the 36,000 local communes
(30%) have grouped themselves into syndicates of land use management to plan
for a more harmonious tourist product both diversified and complementary. A
successful tourist product demands a strong regional will to implement the
required structures. Thanks to these initiatives, visitors have access to a network
of 196 natural reserves (80 of which are local) equipped with guides and centres
of interpretation. Lodging is also often available. In 1996 they welcomed 350,000
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visitors. The government’s action extends to traditional rural villages to enable
them to advertise their vernacular and authentic quality. In 1996,135 belonged to
the association Plus Beaux Villages de France.
Nature tourism is complemented by traditional accommodations run
privately by individual owners registered with nationalcharts.The chain Logis de
France regroups 4000 hotels in rural locations, 90% of which are in historic build-
ings well integrated in the traditional ‘habitas’. The chain Gites de France offers
bed and breakfast in more than 37,000 locations. A chain, St Pierre, specialises in
services to devotees of fishing. Walking and trekking associationsalso have their
own lodging services such as Rando-plume. The supply of lodging for tourism
purposes in rural areas, as shown by these few examples, is extremely diverse, in
part in response to just as variegated a demand. Important investments have
been made in this domain over the past 50 years, which have facilitated rural
development. The state is advocating the streamlining of their tax status and of
their promotion and marketing while it is concerned about the trivialisation of
culture in their advertising. Although the government, at all levels, is supportive
of tourism, even where it has become the only economic activity, it does under-
line that it need not remain a single product. A variety of products need to be
offered visitors and uniformity must be avoided, especially in new construction.
It is more attractive for the visitors as well as for the permanent residents and
more sustainable for investors.
E. Organisation of river tourism
The state took an interest in the tourism vocation of the water network in the
late 1980s, when it had already adopted decentralisation policies. It was thus not
compelled to invest heavily in its upgrading. Contracts have been signed
between several regions (Franche-Comté, Languedoc et Roussillon et Midi-
Pyrénées) and the state in the course of the XIth Plan to encourage river and canal
tourism. This activity is best administered at the local level because of its multiple
diffused locations and site dependent characteristics. Voies Navigables de France
(VNF), which represents the state as landlord and as manager of the network,
must coordinate the activities of regional and local operators so that all benefit
from such synergy that will generate social and economic well-being in the areas
drained by the network. This includes public–private partnerships to increase
accessibility to investment funds. VNF was created as a public organisation in
1991.The state has focused on a few select sites for global sustainable develop-
ment from which it can learn methodologies that will then be applicable to all
other sites on the network (Conseil National du Tourisme, 1997).
The navigable river and canal network of France is the longest in Europe: 8500
km. The network was first used as a tourist attraction in 1949, by the Compagnie
des Bateaux-Mouche of Paris. It transports tourists along the Seine River within the
city. Usage of the national network doubled between 1980 and 1990, but has
remained unchanged since. Attractions include the Canal du Midi which has
been classified as a World Heritage Site, the Briare Bridge-Canal, the Canal of
Burgundy as well as the varied but fragile landscapes these waters flow through.
The network’s tourism value has led to government support only belatedly. In
the period 1988 to 1992 the government did cancel projects such as dams on the
Loire River. The state had financed infrastructure but according to a public
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works logic so that size and location rarely corresponded with the needs. These
mistakes have led Voies Navigables de France to seek partnerships with private
developers as well as with local governments, although it means loss of control
or outright loss of property for VNF (CNT, 1997).
Securing funding for this form of rural tourism has been difficult in spite of its
attractiveness. Rehabilitation of the network is financed by user fees and state
subsidies but they are insufficient to cover expenses caused by several decades of
neglect and numerous demands by a multiplicity of users, not all tourists or tour-
ism promoters. The quality of the water needs to be upgraded and pollution
sources closed. River banks and their immediate environments must be main-
tained. Tourist and navigation safety information needs to be widely diffused in
an aesthetic manner. Many parts of the network will have to be transformed from
merchandise hauling to tourist promenading, with landing and launching pads
and picnic areas. Sustainable development of fluvial tourism will require both
private investments and proper regulatory measures that are best organised at
the local level. Regional authorities could use a reflexive focus on the develop-
ment of the riverine environment as a lever for integrating all stakeholders, espe-
cially communes and départements in local economic growth. Such growth
should include more than just tourism development.
Conclusion
France has a unitary, centralised government, which decides tourism policy at
the national level, even if efforts have been made to decentralise government
activity. Implementation of French public policy is highly complex in that it
involves many actors, different levels of action and authority, and many types of
policy instruments. Much tourism development is subject to regulatory bodies
created independently of tourism concerns, such as aviation and transport,
labour relations, hotel construction and management. It is thus often difficult to
draw a line between the public and the private sector (Lanfant, 1980) even if the
ideology of consumer sovereignty lends support to the idea that state interven-
tion, which connotes domination and control, should be kept out of tourism
development (Wilson, 1988). The presence of the French state will continue to
pervade the tourism industry, which includes enabling the participation in
travel by economically disadvantaged persons. It has been active in both a mana-
gerial way (it has set objectives for tourism and it has introduced organisational
and legislative support to attain these) and in a developmental one (through
financing infrastructure and facilities that receive visitors or through the provi-
sion of specific policies in favour of the tourism sector).
The implementation of the Disneyland Paris project would have been impos-
sible without the redistributive ideology of the French government. The contract
signed by the Walt Disney Company in 1987depended on the convergence of the
strategies of both parties. The French government could never have forced the
Disney Company to implant a resort in Marne-La-Vallée. The Paris Basin was
attractive to the Walt Disney Company because it depends on agglomeration
forces and on a well articulated infrastructure for its successful operation. This
merging of strategies justified the public assistance that the Walt Disney
Company (which was bringing in large private investments) benefited from for
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its implantation in France. This public help enabled the government to offer a
‘new institutional space’ (Jones, 1999), a well-serviced, large acreage of land
within a relatively short time so that only five years passed between the signing
of the Convention and the opening of the park.
The French state tamed the ‘profit-seeking adventurism of the private sector’
(Amin & Malmberg, 1994: 244) even though the French government was relying
more on a managerial model (with greater reliance upon private-sector-led
efforts) of neostatist spatial governance, than a social(ist)one. This circuit of tour-
ism capital had been reined in so that it could not abandon the Francilian land-
scape at the first sign of diminished returns and leave a derelict environment. The
size of the company’s investment, but even more so its knowledge, made it a
potential engine for stimulating new growth. The state found a new niche that
the eastern suburbs of Paris could occupy on the global economic scene. Spillover
effects have been positive for the French government and society from the day
the park opened its gates, and even while it operated in the red (d’Hauteserre,
1997). In 1998, it generated FF21 billion (US$3.2 billion) of secondary and later
economic spillovers in the Ile de France region. Nationaland European territorial
equalisation have hardly been enhanced, but the position of Paris as a major
participant in the global (tourism) economy has. It thus answered the VIth Plan’s
first goal (DATAR, 1970).
Although the state has relinquished its hold even on the region surrounding
Paris, this region still benefits from earlier plans and the projects they captured.
The 1992 plan (SDAURP, 1992) considered the land use management of the
region at a supra-national scale to capitalise on its incorporation within the Euro-
pean Union. It leads the world, for example, in the number of international
congresses. Its main drawing card is its integration in international networks of
exchanges and contacts, integration reinforced by the local articulation of air
links with rapid trains (European and French network) and with the RER (local
public transport links). Its role is of a plaque tournante for transport and tourism.
Roissy is one of the major aerocities of modern times (Robert, 1994: 117). It is also
the only large European airport which still has vast expansion capacities. In 1999,
Eurodisney SCA started on the second part of its 30 year development project in
sector IV of Marne-La-Vallée, as planned in 1987: the project includes a major
commercial centre (90,000 m2), a second theme park which is scheduled to open
in 2002, housing, and transport infrastructure, supporting the continued
economic vitality of the Parisian Basin.
One of the problems future tourism projects will face is that many local public
officials still believe that tourism provides economic benefits with little invest-
ment. Public funds remain scarce. Another problem is that of spatial structur-
ation: tourism spaces rarely correspond with social spaces. Inhabitants rarely
recognise their aspirations in spaces organised as tourist destinations. The main
weaknesses stem from organisational modes too typically French. Some of the
success stories of French planning for tourism development in the face of an
increasingly competitive and globalising political economy are also based on
highly contingent social, institutional, and cultural arrangements. Globalisation
and transnationalisation are not unidirectional forces that constrain ‘local’
agents in similar ways. Different strategy mixes occur in particular spaces at
specific times, depending on historical, economic, political, or socio-spatial
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forces. The French state has treated tourism as an integral part of the social rela-
tions in which they occur even as it has encouraged tourism as a motor of
economic development, which it has also helped to diversify. Perhaps most
importantly, it has not lost sight, either, of the need to preserve, improve even,
French cultural identity in an evolving geopolitical context.
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